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INTRODUCTION

As the media frenzy over the transition of Ms. Caitlyn Jenner has shown, transgender
awareness is ever evolving and accompanied by major legal transformations worldwide. Away from
the spotlights directed at Ms. Jenner, gender variant individuals are still struggling daily with
discrimination once others become aware of their transgender status. Like many other gender
variant people worldwide, Ms. Jessi Dye, a young transwoman from Alabama, was fired from her
job for her gender performance.1 On her first day of work at a nursing home, after completing the
new hire paperwork and employee training, Jessi was called in to see her supervisor, who bluntly
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Alabama Nursing Home Settles Discrimination Case After Firing Transgender Woman, SOUTHERN
POVERTY LAW CENTER (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2015/09/10/alabama-nursing-home-settlesdiscrimination-case-after-firing-transgender-woman [https://perma.cc/7TZF-Q2CQ]. Jessi’s case is not exceptional or local.
It manifests one aspect of the daily struggle for access to resources and opportunities of gender variant individuals.
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asked Jessi “what are you?”2 Jessi replied that she was a transwoman in transition,3 commenting,
“That’s not a question you ask me as a person, it’s a question you ask some little knickknack.”4 The
supervisor asked her what was he “supposed to do with [her]? And how she expected to be
employed when she “looked one way” but was actually “another way.”5 Ms. Dye was terminated,
effective immediately, and instructed to gather her belongings and leave the facility.6
What does it mean to “look one way” but be “another way?” It is not hard to imagine what
Jessi’s supervisor meant; he expected her to dress in masculine attire, to talk “like a man,” to use
male pronouns, and to have other masculine traits, such as in the way she walks, speaks, and styles
her hair, to name a few. What Jessi’s supervisor was expecting of her, based on the fact that she
was assigned ‘male’ at birth, was that Jessi signify herself as “a man,” using external markers
attributed to masculinity to perform her gender identity (or rather, the gender identity that she was
assigned at birth). When she failed to perform the masculinity that was expected from her, she was
no longer a subject, but had transformed into a “knickknack” deserving of the question “what are
you?”
The demand for gender conformity was made even clearer in another recent case of a
young transman from Louisiana who was fired from his job after he refused to sign a written
agreement forcing him to dress according to the company’s “female dress code.”7 Mr. Tristan
Broussard was hired by First Tower Loan in 2013 for a manager trainee position.8 Tristan, who had
been living full time as a man since 2011, reported to work dressed, groomed and conducting
himself according to the professional standards suitable for his gender.9 He was asked to provide a
valid ID in order to complete the paperwork for new employees.10 Tristan provided his driver’s
license, which listed his sex as “F.” The supervisor asked Tristan about it and he replied that he is
a transgender man.11 A week later, the vice president of the company traveled to the branch, took
Tristan and his supervisor aside, and informed Tristan that the company does not want him to dress
“like a man.”12 The VP told Tristan that it would be confusing to the customers, and stated that if

2

Id.

3

The process of changing one’s sexual characteristics with the goal of gender/sex affirmation, confirmation,
or realignment. I am purposely noting all these linguistic options because different people describe their transitioning
differently, and even the term transition itself is contested because it implies one is now something they were not before. I
am using this term to refer to people accessing medical technologies of hormone replacement therapy and different surgical
procedures that change one’s secondary and primary sex characteristics.
4

Bryce Covert, Woman Fired for Being Transgender Scores a Victory, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 11, 2015),
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2015/09/11/3700662/transgender-employment-settlement
[https://perma.cc/8RSJ3A8X].
5

SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, supra note 1.

6

Bil Browning, Fired Trans Employee Asked “What Are You?” Settles Discrimination Case, THE ADVOCATE
(Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.advocate.com/transgender/2015/9/15/fired-trans-employee-asked-what-are-you-winsdiscrimination-case [https://perma.cc/R2M5-SCE3].
7

Complaint & Jury Demand, Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-KWR at ¶ 36
(E.D. La. Apr. 13, 2015).
8
9
10
11
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Id. at ¶ 2.
Id. at ¶ 22.
Id. at ¶ 23.
Id. at ¶ 25.
Id. at ¶ 12.
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Tristan wants to be employed as a man he needs first to undergo surgery.13
It should be noted that Tristan’s gender performance is not ambiguous,14 as the company
did not suspect him of being transgender prior to seeing his ID. Moreover, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission found no evidence that “any customer complained about Mr. Broussard
because of his manner of dress or grooming, or otherwise expressed any confusion or concern as a
result of Mr. Broussard’s presenting as a man.”15 One could argue that if Tristan, a bearded
masculine man, would have been forced to wear women attire, that would be far more “confusing”
for the customers. The VP presented Tristan with the following written statement he was required
to sign as a condition of continued employment: “I understand that my preference to act and dress
as a male, despite having been born a female, is not something that will be in compliance with
Tower Loan’s personnel policies. I have been advised as to the proper dress for females and also
have been provided a copy of the female dress code.”16
Why did the company insist that Tristan commit in writing to dress “as a woman?” Was it
because they truly believed that a masculine, bearded man wearing a dress would be less
“confusing” for their customers? Or was it because they imagined how Tristan should dress, walk,
and talk based on an external sign, such as the sex designation on his ID? Why did they demand
that Tristan undergo surgery? Was it because they thought that customers would or should be able
to “look inside his pants?” Or was it because they were concerned about the lack of cohesion
between the sex he was assigned at birth, his gender, and his gender presentation? When Tristan
refused to perform femininity, as when Jessi failed to perform masculinity, he was no longer a
subject deserving equal treatment. In the eyes of their employers, Tristan and Jessi were not a “legal
man” or a “legal woman.”
What does it mean to legally perform one’s gender identity? As I will suggest, in law, as
in other social constructs, performance refers to the process by which certain configurations of
external markers (such as those listed above) come to signify an “inner truth” about who you are,
your characteristics, and your abilities.17 The signifiers can include all sorts of information that can
be marked on the public body, ranging from bodily gestures such as attire to, for example, the sex
marked on a government-issued ID.18 Every piece of external information (which can be read by an
outside gaze) that signifies one as having a coherent identity stemming from some stable inner core
can be understood as part of one’s performance. What rendered Jessi’s femininity and Tristan’s
masculinity “fake” in the view of their employers was the fact that it did not correlate to what was
believed to be Jessi’s and Tristan’s inner truth. Why was Jessi’s supervisor concerned about her
ability to work with the residents of the nursing home? Why was Tristan’s boss claiming that he
would confuse the customers? Because Jessi’s and Tristan’s attributes did not cohere to socially

13

Id. at ¶ 35.

14

Tristan’s gender performance can be seen in his YouTube interview regarding the case. Southern Poverty
Law Center, “I was fired solely because of my gender,” YOUTUBE (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LeKZA6og3o [https://perma.cc/UM4C-D7GR].
15

EEOC’s Complaint & Jury Demand, Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-02500-CJB-SS
(E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2015).
16

Broussard, No. 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-KWR at ¶ 32.

17

See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
(Routledge Classics ed. 2006) (discussing how is a reiterated social performance rather than the expression of a prior reality).
18

It seems that Mr. Summerford confirmed Jessi’s transgender status by looking at her driver’s license,
which listed her sex designation as “male.” Browning, supra note 6.
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accepted norms of gender, they were not able to both “look” and “be” the same thing.19
As I will further show, the framing of anti-discrimination law through protected classes
and the law’s use of the outside gaze to conclude whether or not an act is discriminatory, show that
the law utilizes performance in deciding cases and allocating rights. The better you can cohere to
an identity included in a protected class, the better your chances of gaining legal recognition; if you
can prove you are a legal “woman,” you can be protected as one. In order to decide whether you
are a “legal woman” or a “legal man,” the court will often de facto evaluate your performance.
I opened with the stories of Jessi and Tristan, whose experiences are by no means unique
but rather common encounters by gender variant people in the neo-liberal market. I ask the reader
to bear this in mind while reading, as it will help us be attuned to the vivid connection between legal
ideals and actual lived experiences of gender variant people. I will explore the ways performance
is intertwined with the ways the law20 thinks about equality within the anti-discrimination
framework. I will question the legal impact of those “inner truths” of one’s identity, suggesting that
this concept serves to police the legal subject and is used in the (mal) distribution of resources and
opportunities. I will not argue that identity is something one takes on and off at will, but rather that
the social meaning attached to one’s performance is perpetually being generated and charged with
value in our societies, and that these mechanisms are reflected in the law, if not upheld by it.
I aim to put forth a gender variant point of view on rights-based advocacy. In Part A, I will
review the current discussions in trans studies’ scholarship and trans political communities
regarding the use of legal rights as an instrument for change. On one side of the debate, following
civil rights tactics, there are those who want to use the law to promote inclusion. On the other side,
respecting critical theories of social change, there are those who consider the law to be a major
player in constituting the social systems that exclude gender variant people. I will read current
debates within their historical relation to the gay and lesbian rights movements as well as to
feminism and critical race theory. I will maintain that although focusing on legal inclusion has
significant drawbacks, it is still an area of change that cannot be disregarded altogether by critical
theories.
In Part B, I will claim that exclusion from resources and opportunities of gender variant
people is inextricably linked, legally as well as affectively, to gender performance. I will suggest
that we can bring the performativity aspects of the law forward by applying an “intrasectional”
analysis of the protected classes relating to gender variant people within employment antidiscrimination law and litigation (ADL). Showing how it is not clear whether one is exposed to
harm due to their “sex,” “gender,” or “sexuality” in the case of gender variance, I will suggest that
a critical reader should not only be attentive to the intersections of different categories, such as race
and sex, but to the merging of experience and practice within a given category, which I refer to as
“intrasectionality.” The intrasectional analysis, continuing the well-known intersectional legal
analysis, will allow me to explore the role of performance in the legally protected categories of
ADL. Intrasectionality will allow me to think about why one is or is not considered a woman in
19

As Jessi’s complaint reveals, she was questioned about her sex, gender identity, and physical anatomy.
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, supra note 1. Tristan, on the other hand, was asked to undergo surgery.
20

It is important to note that when I refer to “the law,” I am looking at the law broadly as a site of social
power, yet I do so by looking at the sphere of rights-based litigation and specifically through the lens of anti-discrimination
law. I will analyze the structure of common law ADL statues and court proceedings. It should be noted that the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 is oriented around the notion of “legal categories” or “protected classes,” which describe the characteristics that
should not be taken into account when making a decision regarding an individual. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
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relation to how sex, gender, and sexuality are constituted legally through performance. My inquiries
into the intrasectionality of the sex category with respect to equality will set the stage for the claim
that ADL is intertwined with performativity.
In Part C, I will look not at what “the law says about itself”21 but at what the law actually
does. I will analyze the transgender legal claim for equality by using the Butlerian drag queen show
metaphor, in which what is supposedly “fake” is revealed for all to see. I will focus on the
implications of protecting gender variant individuals from discrimination without accounting for
the social mechanisms that make it possible. I will suggest that the law’s continued investment in
legal gender stability is upholding the system that excludes gender variants and others. I will point
out the limitation of current inclusionary paradigms and suggest the possibilities of an intrasectional
performative analysis of existing law. I will try and formulate the basis for a legal analysis that
addresses the actual lived experience of gender variance and gendered (mal) distribution of life
chances. I will then offer a reformulation of anti-discrimination claims by shifting the basis of
comparison. Instead of considering how “legal men” are treated differently than “legal women,” I
will ask whether one was treated differently than someone whose gender performance coheres to
socially accepted norms. My conclusion will show how using the performative analysis offered
here would enable ADL to better serve the people it aims to protect.
I.

TRANS LIBERALS VERSUS TRANS RADICALS – OR, WHAT IS GENDER VARIANCE?

As I set out to locate the intersections of ADL and performativity by looking at gender
variant exclusion, I find myself limited by the tool I am using – language. It is hard to decide how
to describe the people I wish to discuss. Many writers have chosen the word “transgender” as an
umbrella term referring to all individuals “whose gender identity or expression does not conform
to the social expectations for their assigned sex at birth,”22 in that it refers to a range of identities
and behaviors that challenge the accepted social norm of genders. It is a political term that arose
outside the scope of medical discourse and was adopted by activists and academics alike. The term
offered the community possibilities to articulate itself without referring to the medical pathology of
the term “transsexual,” allowing new ways to describe oneself outside of the narrow and
normalizing enforced medical narrative.23
In recent years, the term “transgender” has been criticized for erasing the differences in
experiences and struggles of different groups (mainly the needs and desires of self-identified
transsexuals). Others have criticized the term’s connection with post-structuralist theory that
implies the nonexistence of any gender and thereby delegitimizes the desire to belong to one of the
two socially accepted genders.24 Other people who transgress gender do not identify with this term
at all and use a variety of other words to describe themselves and their experiences.25 Some have
challenged the way in which the term “transgender” internalizes the dichotomies between gender
and sexuality, due to which the term fails to capture the real life experiences and identities of many
and replicates the apparatus of narrowing the human experience (a criticism the term itself makes
21
22
23
24

Dean Spade, Laws as Tactics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 442, 471 (2011).
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS xiv (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006).
Id. at 152.
VIVIANE NAMASTE, INVISIBLE LIVES: THE ERASURE OF TRANSSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE (1st

ed. 2000).
25

David Valentine, “I went to bed with my own kind once”: the erasure of desire in the name of identity, 23
LANG. COMMUN. 123, 135 (2003).
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toward the medical term “transsexual”).26 Respecting the critiques, I will use the terms “trans” and
“gender variant” to talk about people whose gender presentation does not conform to the social
expectations attached to the sex category they were assigned at birth. I will use the term
“transgender” to refer to the political movement. When I refer to people who identify themselves
like Jessi and Tristan, I will use the term they have picked.
Trans scholars and legal advocates are divided on the question of the use of ADL as a tool
for promoting the interests of the trans communities. The main controversy is whether ADL serves
underprivileged gender variant individuals or merely redefines the borders of gender to include very
specific configurations of gender variant identities and practices. Agreeing with the position that
abandoning rights-based litigation altogether is a privileged position,27 I will argue for the
possibility of incorporating substantial aspects of the critiques against ADL into a viable legal
strategy for rights-based litigation. Acknowledging that the law is a tactic of social power,28 I will
try to produce an outline for a tactical use of the law. I will argue that by deconstructing the legal
phenomena of discrimination, we might be able to promote a discussion about the law’s significant
part in creating and upholding social mechanisms and (mal) distributing resources and
opportunities29 that exclude, among others, gender variant identities and practices.
Before I delve into those critiques and suggest a nuanced perspective on the controversy
centered on the relation between the subject and society, it is important to understand how the social
system of gender works in respect to trans identities and practices. The socially accepted norms of
gender, sex, and sexuality, i.e. heterosexual norms, distinguish between two diametrically opposed
sexes from which are derived two diametrically opposed genders: the masculine man who was
assigned male at birth, and the feminine woman who was assigned female at birth.30 Under these
norms, any sexual or gendered identity or practice is set in relation to a normative ideal of
heterosexuality, i.e. a sexual relation between male-assigned men and female-assigned women.31
There is an alleged essential and inherent difference between men/males and women/females that
is reflected in their characteristics and abilities.32 Those differences are perceived to be natural, and
this justifies the well-known social hierarchy of gender headed by non-trans men. This is a complex
system of values which we are all forced to live by from the moment we are categorized at birth as
either “boys” or “girls,” usually based only on visible genitals.33 This value system teaches us the

26

Spade, supra note 21.

27

Kylar Broadus, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Protections for Transgender People,
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 93, 99 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006).
28

Michel Foucault, Governmentality, THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 95
(Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
29

DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF
LAW 29–30 (2011).
30

Stevi Jackson, Gender, sexuality and heterosexuality: The complexity (and limits) of heteronormativity, 7
FEM. THEORY 105, 106 (2006).
31
32

Id. at 107.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on sex equality under law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1290 (1991).

33

It is interesting to note that this very early sex classification is allegedly based in actual biology and not
on mere social ideology. However, it is in this very moment that one can view how a social value is attached to a nonsignificant biological trait, such as visible genitals. This one biological trait that is recoded about the newborn, among many
others that are actually used to determine scientific sex (which is considered a spectrum), affects how they will be treated
by everybody with whom they encounter – what baby clothes they will be dressed in, what toys they will get, and even what
kinds of compliments their parents will receive regarding them from strangers in the street. Obviously this has no real
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social role we must portray as either “masculine” or “feminine.” As I will illustrate, society
demands that all of us be heterosexual feminine female/women or heterosexual masculine
men/male and punishes anybody who dares to cross these borders.34 Being inside the border is part
of what constitutes our subjectivity, and our citizenship.
Trans identities are also created within this dichotomous set of norms. From the
perspective that accepts the mutual exclusivity of sex and gender, trans people are those who lack
a correlation between their subjective experience of gender and their birth-assigned sex. Because
trans intelligibility is formed in a society that sanctifies this perspective, trans people often feel that
something is “wrong” with them.35 This feeling is what medical discourse refers to as gender
dysphoria,36 a feeling sometimes described as being born in the “wrong body,”37 which is
understood as arising from an inherent discrepancy between birth-assigned sex, gender identity, and
gender expression.
However, the experience of discrepancy itself exposes the traditional tie between sex,
gender, and sexuality as non-universal. It also reveals the dichotomous existence of two genders to
be socially inflicted. The fact that our society produces individuals who do not easily fit into the
existing gender/sex order challenges the naturalization of this order and unearths its socio-political
dimension.38 Hence, the experience of dysphoria and distress is not the mere result of a subjective
individual’s discrepancy of sex and gender; rather, it is the effect of insubordination, deliberate or
not, to the social prohibition on crossing the borders of sex, gender, and sexuality. This is the trans
paradox: on the one hand, what constitutes trans identity is the discovery of discrepancy in the
correlation between gender and sex, and a realization that the system of two all-inclusive mutually
exclusive categories is too narrow to reflect one’s experience. On the other hand, the trans person
can only be a part of society if he or she aspires to adopt a normalized behavior. In other words, in
order to be legitimized in their gender non-conformity, the trans person must aspire to take part in
the same gendered social structure that caused their non-conformity in the first place.39
My analysis of ADL from a gender variant perspective will follow Judith Butler’s analysis
of gender performativity.40 The Butlerian analysis points out the falseness of the social deductive
process; that when you see someone’s presentation (their clothes, hair style, diction, presence, etc),
you assume that presentation is an indication of a specific “sex,” and that “sex” correlates to
“gender,”41 which in turn indicates “sexuality.” Following Derrida, Butler argues that there is no
true “origin” that is represented, but that the presentation is what constitutes “sex” as an origin from
biological significance to the newborn and says nothing about their characteristics and abilities.
34

BUTLER, supra note 17, at 190.

35

Sandy Stone, The“Empire” Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto (1993), http://w2.eff.org/Net_
culture/Gender_issues/empire_strikes_back.html [https://perma.cc/3RL6-W9WG].
36

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, DSM-5 (5th ed. 2013).
37

JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES
136 (1st ed. 2004).
38

See generally Dean Spade, Resisting medicine, re/modeling gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15 (2003)
(discussing the concerns with relying on medical evaluation of gender identity in legal work towards trans equality).
39

See generally Ido Katri, You Scare the Customers: Mechanism of Gender Policing in Anti-Discrimination
Law in AN OTHER SEX- ISRAELI QUEER THEORY (Aeyal Gross, Amalia Ziv and Raz Yosef eds. Resling Publishing House,
2016).
40
41

BUTLER, supra note 17.
Understood here as “gender roles.”
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which gendered sexual acts flow out to the public body. In this sense, gender attributes and acts are
“the various ways in which a body shows or produces its cultural signification.”42 These acts are
public, meaning that what constitutes them is their ability to be read from the outside, as “they are
instituted in an exterior space through the stylization of the body.”43 Although Butler talks directly
about “bodily gestures, movements, and styles of various kinds,”44 based on her own description of
the repetitive gender act, it is clear that all actions that signify one as having a coherent identity
constitute performance. I will return to discuss Butler’s main theoretical standpoint on this issue
when I present the case of discrimination of a trans claimant.
Moreover, as I will further elaborate, only people who follow hegemonic lines in
everything but their gender identity can ever fully adopt a normalized behavior that would render
their transgression coherent. At this point it is enough to bear in mind the role coherence plays in
both ADL and trans social integration, where being read from the outside as a “normative” citizen
is key for making intelligible claims.
A. The First Gay Divorce: The Separation of Sexuality and Gender

Transgender as a category of identity and community organizing emerged in the 1990s, in
the background of the development of the gay rights movement and lesbian feminism in regard to
social regimes of sexuality and gender.45 In order to understand how transgender came to be, we
need to understand how the gay and lesbian struggles helped to unlink sexuality and gender.
Transgender as a concept emerged as the shelter for those neglected by the new gender normative
model of homosexuality. This process shaped the transgender political movement in different ways,
forcing it to aspire to be more inclusive while at the same time replicating the exclusionary
mechanisms that constitute the current homosexual heyday.46
Modern western norms regarding gender and sexuality have developed in a process that
has stretched over centuries.47 Up until the middle of the twentieth century, what we would consider
under present discourse to be sexuality and gender were bundled up in the category of deviant
behavior.48 When Foucault describes the “invention” of homosexuality as a disorder – a kind of
“androgyny” – in one of the most famous passages from The History of Sexuality,49 he sheds light
on how homosexuality was linked as a category of being and practice with what would later be
called “gender performance.”50 Homosexuality was seen as a gender behavior; homosexual men
42
43
44

BUTLER, supra note 17, at 192.
Id. at 191.
Id.

45

See generally DAVID VALENTINE, IMAGINING TRANSGENDER: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF A CATEGORY (2007)
(discussing the emergence of trans issues and community organizing and their connections to the gay and lesbian rights
movements).
46

See BRENDA COSSMAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS: THE LEGAL AND CULTURAL REGULATION OF SEX AND
BELONGING 3 (2007) (discussing the exclusionary aspects of the new gay inclusive citizenship with respect to neoliberal
forms of self-governance of heterogeneity of identity and practices).
47

MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. 1: AN INTRODUCTION 62 (Reissue ed. 1990).

48

See generally SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY (1st ed. 2008) (discussing transgender history
and developments in the post-World War II transsexual and transvestite communities).
49

FOUCAULT, supra note 47, at 43.

50

See generally Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and
Feminist Theory, 40 THEATRE J. 519 (1988) (arguing that gender is not a stable identity but is rather “an identity tenuously
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were associated with feminine behavior and desires,51 and lesbian women, if considered at all,52
were only recognized when they displayed typical masculine behaviors.53 As Foucault argues, the
social division between deviant and normal, as well as public policing, was less directed at deviants
and more towards the “normative.” By focusing on the deviant and the process of deviation, the
“normative” becomes transparent, gaining an ontological status as the “neutral” and “normal.”
Foucault explains how this external process of framing the borders of “normative” behavior has
been internalized to self-discipline.54 By framing what is improper, the “normative” defined the
borders of the proper, as well as the borders between subject and object, and citizen and non-citizen.
Whoever is able to self-govern their subjectivity so that it remains within the lines of “normal”
becomes a bearer of rights.55 Citizenship is thus a strategy of governance. 56
The framing of the deviant as opposed to the normal encompasses what it means to be a
“good citizen.” By looking at the process of becoming a citizen with respect to its normalizing
power,57 we can understand how it relies on mutually exclusive categories of belonging and
otherness (inter alia sex/gender),58 while at the same time affixing the rights-bearing status of the
categories.59 As part of the ongoing process of constantly constituting citizenship through mutually
exclusive categories of belonging and otherness, the gendered/sexed deviant started to break from
within, giving birth to a new gender normative homosexual subject. From the early to mid-twentieth
century, sex and gender deviance began to be understood as separate and mutually exclusive in both
medical discourse and political movements for recognition.60
constituted in time… through a stylized repetition of acts”).
51
52
53

VALENTINE, supra note 45, at 41.
MAD FOR FOUCAULT: RETHINKING THE FOUNDATIONS OF QUEER THEORY, 43–83 (2009).
VALENTINE, supra note 45, at 46.

54

MICHEL FOUCAULT, TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF: A SEMINAR WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT (Luther H.
Martin, Huck Gutman, & Patrick H. Hutton eds., 1988).
55

COSSMAN, supra note 46, at 14.

56

Id. at 5. (viewing citizenship as “invoking the ways that different subjects are constituted as members of a
polity, the ways they are or are not granted rights, responsibilities, and representations within that polity, as well as
acknowledgement and inclusion through a multiplicity of legal, political, cultural and social discourse. It is about the way
subjects are constituted as citizens and the way citizenship itself is constituted.”). Having practiced law within the Israeli
legal system, where the political status of individuals is heavily stratified and the government effectively controls populations
through different legal norms, I am aware of the universalism of the term “citizenship.” However, Cossman’s articulation
of the subject’s constitution through citizenship allows me to go beyond the classical understanding of citizenship as a mere
bundle of political rights.
57
58

Id. at 8.
Id. at 2–3, 5.

59

We should also consider how this understanding of citizenship as an all-inclusive regime that distributes
all kinds of privileges affectively impacts those it excludes in a way that shapes their demands for inclusion. While it is
beyond the scope of this work, I suggest that this affective impact is significantly noticeable in the formulation of the
transgender community in the following pages.
60

It should be noted that the modern genealogy of gender as a separate concept comes from the work of the
sexologist John Money. Harry Benjamin later adopted this distinction. See generally HARRY BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL
PHENOMENON: A SCIENTIFIC REPORT ON TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX CONVERSION IN THE HUMAN MALE AND FEMALE (1966)
(presenting the first diagnostic criteria for transsexualism). When feminism later adopted the concept of “gender,” it did so
in a different way. Sexologists like Money and Benjamin considered gender an inherent stable truth, whereas sex was an
unstable factor open to manipulation through modern science. In contrast, feminism saw sex as inherent and gender as
unstable and social. See generally JENNIFER GERMON, GENDER: A GENEALOGY OF AN IDEA, 23–62 (2009) (analyzing the
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Gay and lesbian liberation movements framed their identities and practices through the
new concept of sexual orientation, an ontological characteristic that is both internal and invisible.61
In other words, they claimed that one’s sexual identity, i.e. sexual orientation, is inherently different
from gender.62 One of the main tactics of the homophile movement63 was to adopt a gender
normative model of homosexuality, shedding away the image (and reality) of “fairies.”64 This
allowed gay liberation to promote that idea that “we are just like you” but for one invisible (and
hence private) aspect of our inner world that has no effect on the public sphere.65 A similar course,
but from a very different political angle, was taken by the 1970s lesbian-feminists when they
rejected the butch-femme model and transwomen participation to give preference to the “Womynborn-Womyn” gender normative model of lesbianism.66 This gender normative model helped
lesbian-feminism to claim unity of all women based on biological “truth” of birth-assigned sex.67
Even though the homophile movement and lesbian-feminism employed different tactics, they both
made use of the idea that sex and gender exist in two separate spheres to promote their goals.68 Both
of these movements rejected gender variant identities and practices, i.e. “visible” deviants, no
matter what those deviants called themselves.69

contemporary ideologies of gender with a particular focus on John Money's work to demonstrate the influence of his ideas
on what it means to be a sexed subject). Valentine can help us understand the link between these two seemingly contradictory
approaches through his description of the gay movement’s efforts to de-pathologize homosexuality through gender
normativity. VALENTINE, supra note 45, at 54–55. Notably, when ‘homosexuality’ was removed from the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, ‘Gender Identity Disorder’ was added. Id.
This category encapsulated transsexuals and others who engaged in visibly gender variant behaviors and who had not been
explicitly recognized in the DSM. Id.
61
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TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 149–150.
VALENTINE, supra note 45, at 53–59.
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Defined as a North American advocacy group of gay men “advocating or supportive of the interests, civil
rights, and welfare of homosexuals.” DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/homophile [https://perma.
cc/2KKB-3F9P] (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). Interestingly, they choose the word “homophile” to distinguish themselves
from the pathologies’ term “homosexual,” a move that the trans movement later adopted with the term “transgender.”
64
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VALENTINE, supra note 45, at 42.
DAVID L. ENG, THE FEELING OF KINSHIP: QUEER LIBERALISM AND THE RACIALIZATION OF INTIMACY 30

(2010).
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Emi Koyama, Whose Feminism Is It Anyway?, TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER 698, 700–701 (Susan
Stryker & Stephan Whittle eds., 2006).
67
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VALENTINE, supra note 45, at 45–48.
Id. at 55–59.
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Id. at 56. Also, Valentine argues that the distinction between biological sex, social gender, and sexual
desire was a move that enabled a distinction between those who “visibly transgressed the conventional expectations of
masculinity and femininity in clothing, occupation, or manner (the contemporary realm of ‘gender,') and those who, despite
being content to be socially men and women in concordance with their birth ascription, were erotically drawn to people of
the same general embodiment ('sexuality').” Id. at 57. It should be noted that these histories are much richer and more
complex, involving different historical events that occurred, such as the AIDS epidemic and the lesbian “sex wars,” but I
cannot discuss them in depth as part of this article.
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B. Single Axis Analysis and the Outsourcing of the Deviance

The gender normative model was tailored with respect to mainstream norms of gender
which were, and still are, white, able, and middle class.70 These norms fail to make broader claims
against the social systems in which sexed/gendered subjects/activities are given different social
value. Such a critique would have to address the ways that the social exclusionary framework of
class and race, among other factors,71 nourish and are nourished by the sex/gender paradigm.
Women of color feminism has a long tradition of analyzing the binding power of universalized
critique centered on a single axis of gender binary.72 The act of overlooking the ways in which
gender domination is shaped by race, class, and culture73 is the act of erasure of non-white, nonmiddle class, non-western, and differently-abled subjects.74
While it is true that single axis analysis erases other differences, I argue that even within
the category of sex/gender, the single axis focus creates erasure. I argue that this analysis is also
relevant to the separation of sex, gender, and sexuality. By focusing on a single axis of critique, one
ignores the impact of the other vectors of the experience of “gendered control.” By focusing on
sexual orientation without accounting for gender policing, the critiques75 effectively and affectively
erase multilayered experience of gender variant identities and practices.76 These critiques thus
overlook socially exclusionary mechanisms created by elaborate systems of gendered/sexually
stratified citizenship that are pivotal in linking different social values to identities and practices
based on sex, gender, and sexuality.77
It has been argued that white women integrated into the job market by hiring black women
to do their housework.78 Thus, white feminism did not change the gendered distribution of labor, it
merely outsourced it to black women.79 Paraphrasing this claim, I argue that when gays and lesbians
adopted a gender normative model of homosexuality, they outsourced the deviance status to gender
variant individuals. The rise of a political gay movement and lesbian-feminism in the mid to late
twentieth century, which adopted a gender normative model, had in many ways “outsourced” the
image of “perverseness” to gender variant individuals. The gender normative model of
homosexuality, though useful in promoting certain issues such as gay marriage, did not have a
significant disruptive impact on the social mechanisms that normalize society, the mechanisms
Foucault claimed were served by the “invention” of homosexuality.80 The later emergence of the
category of transgender is rooted in this racialized and class inflicted history of ontological
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 199–201.
Such as culture, ableism, xenophobia, and other forces of exclusion, some we have not even named yet.
CHELA SANDOVAL, METHODOLOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 45–47 (2000).
Among other factors. Id.
Id. at 46.
As well as transgender critique, as I will argue later.
VALENTINE, supra note 45, at 201.
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Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Noted for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in CULTURE, SOCIETY
AND SEXUALITY: A READER 143, 149–153 (Richard Parker & Peter Aggleton eds., 1999).
78

Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 143-145.
79

Id.

80

Huffer points out in MAD FOR FOUCAULT that the processes stretched over centuries, and I will add that
the process of “outsourcing” the invert to gender variant is a continuous part of this process and that even the rise of
transgender identities, as I will further elaborate, is part of this continuum, MAD FOR FOUCAULT, supra note 52, at 62.
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separation between “sex” and “gender.” The development of separate legal categories of sex, sexual
orientation, gender identity, and expression continues the systemic oversight.
C. From the Emergence of a Transgender Movement to Current Debates

To reiterate the argument so far, as part of the claim of separation between the spheres of
sexuality and gender put forward by the gender normative model of homosexuality, the role of
“social deviance” was “outsourced” to gender variant people. With this context in mind, we turn
now to explore the emergence of trans political identities. Trans identity emerged from the erasure
created by the gender normative models of gay and lesbian political identities, with their specific
underlying biases and their practices of gaining access to citizenship through essentialized identity
claims. This will help us understand the current debates of trans advocacy for and against the use
of rights-based claims.
As stated above, the emergence of “transgender” as a political identity and community
dates back to the early 1990s when North American activist groups, as well as prominent academics
and theorists, coined the term “transgender” as a political opposition to the medical term
“transsexual.”81 The new term aspired to create collective demands for diverse groups, such as
transsexuals, cross-dressers, transvestites, androgens, gender non-conforming individuals, and even
butch women or sissy men, as well as drag performers.82
Transgender was not only a response to the separation of sexuality and gender, but a
continuance of this separation. Transgender refers to individuals whose “gender identity” or
“gender expression” does not conform to the “social expectations for their assigned sex at birth.”83
Hence, gender is separated from sex. This is noticeable by the move from “trans-sexual” to “transgender.” One can be both transgender and gay not because gender and sexuality are intertwined,
but because transgender refers to their “gender” which is separate from their “sex” and “sexuality.”
The transgender claim is that all the different identities and practices that are grouped
together under the “transgender umbrella” share a “common political investment in a right to gender
self-determination.”84 As in many other social movements, the liberal and the radical transgender
advocates disagree on the tactics that should be taken to secure a right to gender self-determination
that would ensure access to resources and opportunities. While the liberals advocate for inclusion,
for the recognition of trans identities, the radicals argue that it is the social structure of gender that
creates the exclusion of gender variant persons in the first place. That is, one side asks to allow trans
persons to participate in the given social order and thereby create change, and the other side asks to
change the social order and thereby create redistribution of resources and opportunities. It is a
debate about the meaning of belonging, which questions who exactly are the beneficiaries of the
demands made in the name of the collective. These tensions over whom the transgender movement
represents and how it does so have been at the heart of the transgender debate over the use of ADL
since the emergence of the movement. While the liberal side strikes for inclusion in ADL in hopes
that changing the law would change lives,85 others are skeptical about the law’s ability to create
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Much like the attempt to steer away from the term “homosexual” with “homophile.”
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As Susan Stryker notes in TRANSGENDER HISTORY, this category is still “under construction” where new
identities such as “genderqueer” or “bigender” are added and others such as “drag” are removed. STRYKER, supra note 48.
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TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 5.
THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER xi (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 1st ed. 2006).
BROADUS, supra note 27.
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social change, or to give up its role in upholding the system of exclusionary categories.86
D. Liberal Trans Legal Strategies

The liberal legal-academic movement aspires to advance social acceptance of trans people
by developing a progressive discourse of fundamental preconditions of the phenomena in order to
justify inclusion.87 Within this movement, there are those who take different stands on the
essentializing of trans identities. Some stress the ability of the law to adapt to less essentialist
categories, such as gender expression and identity. Others argue that there is no problem with using
the current legal framework, insofar as it applies to trans persons who are fine with identifying as
male/men or female/women or that can articulate their demand within this framework.88 Then there
are those who argue that we need to expand the categories to include gender identity and gender
expression precisely so that trans persons need not fit within the categories of male/female as such.
The liberal attempts are trying to complicate the legal categories, but they are still working within
the law. The liberal trans tactics follow similar tactics as the gay movement, aspiring to secure
inclusion in anti-discrimination and hate-crime legalization for “gender identity” or “gender
expression” and to promote the visibility of “positive” transgender images in the public sphere by
educating the general public as well as specialized professionals such as medical staff, social
workers and educators.
The inclusive approach has had some important success worldwide in recent years. The
need to protect trans people from discrimination echoes globally and has reached the highest
international institutions.89 Federal, state, and local authorities have enacted various laws and
policies aimed at protecting trans individuals. For instance, state legislation forbidding
discrimination of transgender persons in employment now exists in Washington, Oregon,
California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Vermont, Maine,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, and the District of Columbia.90
Under the Obama administration, the federal government has seen a tremendous shift in providing
access to health care and identification documents for transgender people through administrative
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Dean Spade, For Those Considering Law School (2010), http://www.deanspade.net/wp-content/uploads/
2010/10/For-Those-Considering-Law-School-Nov-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SPT-KNLP].
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THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 84, at 3–4; THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER 2, 3–
5 (Susan Stryker & Aren Aizura eds., 1st ed. 2013).
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BROADUS, supra note 27.
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For example, in June 2011 the United Nation Human Rights Council upheld that the protection against
discrimination and violence on the basis of gender identity is part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and called
for the use of human rights law to address the problems faced by transgendered people. Human Rights Council Res. 17/19,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1 (2011). In September 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a second
decision that reflected grave concerns with acts of violence and discrimination in all regions of the world and called for
sharing of good practices and ways to overcome violence and discrimination. Human Rights Council Res. 27/32, U.N. Doc
A/HRC/27/L.27/Rev.1 (2014).
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See Equality Maps, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps (last
visited Jan. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/U67Z-G543] (detailing transgender equality legislation across the U.S.). See Cal.
Penal Code § 422.56; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-34-401(7.5); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 489-3; 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-103(O-1);
Iowa Code Ann. § 216.6; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4553(9-C); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.03, subd. 44; N.J. Stat. Ann. §
10:5-5(rr); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-2(Q); Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.100(6); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-24-2.1; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, §
144; Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(26); D.C. Code § 2-1401.02(12A).
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prerogatives.91 However, with the dawn of the Trump administration, much of this progress might
be undone. Also notable is the Employment Anti-Discrimination Act that passed in the Senate in
2013 but died in the House of Representatives. This bill, introduced in every congress since 1994
(except for the 109th), was changed in 2007, after long deliberation, to include a protection on the
basis of gender identity.92
There is no denying that recent years have seen tremendous developments in public
intelligibility related to the transgender community and its rights, leading to the rise of the
transgender movement dubbed as the “next civil rights frontier.”93 However, these achievements
have been denounced by more radical transgender advocates for failing to promote significant
change in the lives of the community members they aim to serve,94 especially those in the margins
of the community who struggle with multiple grounds for exclusion, and whose identities and
practices exceed the single axis of gender identity by way of non-hegemonic sexualities, race, class,
and ability.95 Countering these criticisms, radical trans advocates have shifted away from identitybased claims and ADL to focus on the regulatory scheme where gender currently upholds the
system of mutually exclusive identity categories.
E. Radical Trans Legal Analysis

The radical trans claim is a distributive one, trying to locate the role of gender identity
within the stratification of social goods. It stems from the tension between the heterogeneity of
gender variant identities and practice and the collective term transgender. Following queer theory,
feminist theory, and critical race theory, the radical analysis tries to reflect the ways in which gender
variant exclusion is part of a greater social scheme where merely “changing the law” is not enough
but rather the law is a vital part of the scheme itself.96 Scholars, such as David Valentine, have noted
that the life and experiences of gender variant individuals and their communities, especially those
at the margins, do not conform to current terminology or understand their identity and practices as
a sole matter of “gender expression.”97 Valentine warns us of the dangers of marginalization of
more heterogeneous trans identities and experiences. The focus on inclusion and unification of all
gender variant practices into one category of identity masks racial, class, geographical, and other
biases.98 The byproduct of reframing the borders of (legal or other) inclusion is the creation of new
borders.
The use of identity categories in the context of gender variance forces one to define those
91

Juliet Eilperin, Obama’s quiet transgender revolution, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obamas-quiet-transgender-revolution/2015/11/30/6879527e-95e4-11e5-b5e4279b4501e8a6_story.html [https://perma.cc/HRB7-WL5X].
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House panel rejects last ditch effort to pass ENDA, WASHINGTON BLADE: GAY NEWS, POLITICS, LGBT
RIGHTS (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/12/03/house-panel-rejects-last-ditch-panel-pass-enda/
[https://perma.cc/GDT6-JQJZ].
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Katy Steinmetz, The Transgender Tipping Point, TIME (May 29, 2014), http://time.com/135480/
transgender-tipping-point/ [https://perma.cc/U3T3-UXBH].
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SPADE, supra note 29, at 60.
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See id. (explaining that given the disproportionate rates of poverty in the transgender community,
especially for people of color, these people might be at the margins but are not necessarily the minority).
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Dean Spade, Intersectional resistance and law reform, 38 SIGNS 4, 1031–1034 (2013).
Valentine, supra note 25.
See THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER 2, supra note 87, at 8.
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identities and narrow the variety of possible ones, despite the fact that trans people identify
themselves in many different ways, sometimes using more than one category. The law forces trans
rights claimants to accept one category or the other to be recognized. There is an underlying belief
about the inherent nature of trans identities as moving from one gender to the other. It is possible
that the law could recognize certain trans individuals, to the extent that they identify with the
categories available in law. In other words, by assigning trans people rights based on a closed
system of exclusive categories, the law ensures that these rights constitute an effort to take part in
the socially accepted order of sex/gender.
As a result, the ability and desire of trans individuals to be “like everyone else” have a
significant role in determining their access to rights and legal procedures.99 However,
discrimination against trans people happens precisely when they are revealed to be “not like
everyone else,” i.e. they do not follow the socially accepted norms of sex/gender. If no one knows
you are trans, they cannot discriminate against you on that basis. Thus, protection based on the
condition of being “like everyone else” leaves out those most exposed to discrimination. It is for
this reason that the radical trans legal-academic movement would argue that these borders are the
means by which trans exclusion is created, justified and upheld.
The radical part of the transgender movement points to the gender binary itself as an
oppressive power. It is one of many governance strategies that constitute trans exclusion from
resources and opportunities.100 Furthermore, the radical stand would argue that the focus on the
individual hinders the critique of external structural social systems of gender and sexuality that
create the exclusion of gender. Following Foucault, radical trans advocates ask to look at gender as
a regulatory power that has attached different value to different gendered identities and practices as
“a core element of participation in our capitalist economy.”101 This regulatory power explains the
“disproportionate poverty and incarceration [of] poor, gender transgressive people.”102 Hence, from
this radical point of view, in order to secure access to resources and opportunities, trans people need
to fight the social system of gender itself. For these reasons, Dean Spade and other radical advocates
reject rights-based advocacy, claiming it empowers the regulatory scheme of gender by upholding
the system of mutually exclusive identity categories.
II. TRANS INTRASECTIONALITY – THE THING WE CANNOT NOT WANT

Supposedly one must choose between the total liberal recognition strategy and the radical
redistributive strategy, presuming that the two, like heteronormative sex/gender, are mutually
exclusive. I will argue, however, that there is a possibility to integrate a significant part of the
critique put forward by the radical analysis back into rights-based litigation. Following Spade’s call
“to stop believing what the law says about itself is true and what the law says about us is what
matters,”103 I will go beyond current critiques to further examine the function of the legal categories
that are used to protect against discrimination on the basis of gender variance, in order to pin point
their “intrasectional” relation to one another. Instead of abandoning rights-based litigation
completely, I will argue that this existing and relatively accessible legal mechanism should be
tactically used to demand more accountability from the law for the role it plays in creating and
99
100
101
102
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Spade, supra note 38.
See SPADE, supra note 29, at xiv.
See Spade, supra note 21, at 232.
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SPADE, supra note 29, at 128.
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upholding the gender binary. The demand that marginalized communities let go of their desire to
be seen as equal is not politically viable and even runs the risk of imperialist tendencies.104
Answering the criticisms against the use of the existing legal categories by trans claimants, Paisley
Currah reminds us that non-trans people enjoy enormous privileges by having their gender
recognized.105 Currah continues to explain how the anti-discrimination framework is one of the only
ways available for minorities to demand resources and opportunities.106
One can see that the liberal advocates look for recognition while the radical advocates seek
to dismantle the social system that distribute life chances in accordance with gender compliance.
The liberals ask to entrench “transgender” and by doing so, aim to create a new self-made selfrepresentation of the group that would publicly assert respect and esteem from society at large.107
The radicals stress that misrecognition of trans identities is not a “free-standing” harm, but a
distributive injustice caused by a social-political matrix of sex/gender.108 They further claim that
the entrenchment of transgender narrows the scope of protection because it only recognizes those
individuals who can “prove” their authentic belonging to the community by virtue of a coherent
identity.109 Yet, the process of constituting coherent gender identity is a process of framing and
reframing the accepted borders of sex/gender. Moreover, this process excludes the complex and
heterogeneous gender variant identities and practice, rendering visible for inclusion those who
“neatly fit” within the other characteristics of the hegemon’s identity, such as class, race and ability.
Indeed, as Dean Spade points out, “in the face of large scale social movements demanding change,
governments have often created laws that declare equality or neutrality in order to quell dissent and
maintain the status quo to the greatest extent possible,”110 thereby maintaining hegemony itself.
I borrow David Eng’s reference to Spivak in the context of queer liberalism in Lawrence
vs. Texas,111 claiming that rights-based litigation is something that we “cannot not want.”112 I will
therefore try to identify the ways the law is already used to promote trans interests, aspiring to move
away from looking at who the rights claimants are to what they want and need. I will suggest that
this move can open a space for discussion about the accountability of the law, the institutions it
regulates, and the structural insecurities faced by marginalized groups. However, the fact that I am
using the very categories that I critique in order to better account for the structural aspect of the
inequalities is a challenge I can only partially address. In what follows, I will apply the concept of
intersectionality to the category of sex itself to expose its “intrasectionality.” Using the
intrasectional perspective will help me to deconstruct discrimination on the basis of gender variance
in a way that will bring forward some of the structural aspects that are otherwise excluded.
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PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 158–165

(1991).
105

Paisley Currah, Gender pluralisms under the transgender umbrella, TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3–31.
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A. ADL and Marginalized Communities – The Broken Promise for Equality

Anti-discrimination laws have long been criticized for failing to deliver their egalitarian
promise and create real change in the social status of those they protect. They have been criticized
for creating an image of equality that hides the realities of disparities and their individual scope.113
Moreover, it is argued that rights-based litigation hinders the structural distribution of life
chances.114 Because it relies on coherent identity claims that exclude heterogeneous or multilayered
experiences, rights-based litigation often fails to serve the needs of individuals and groups whose
identities and experiences reflect more than one category.115
As I will go on to elaborate in the analysis of the trans rights claimant, this coherence of
identity is only achievable by the process of repetition of behaviors attributed to a certain identity.
As such, it is not an indication of some “inner truth” about ones belonging to a certain protected
class but rather a presentation of an “inner truth” that constitutes belonging. The legal discourse in
this framing is narrowed to developing compatibility with a specific category, much like the way
trans health protocols forces trans people to articulate a specific story in order to get access to health
care. This process contravenes the stated purposes of the legal and medical procedures because it
forces patients/rights claimants to tell the institution what it wants to hear and not what is actually
going on, thus making it impossible for that institution to be able to offer a remedy. Moreover, the
perquisite of coherence reveals how ADL interlocks with self-discipline, further elaborating the
connections between these allegedly independent forms of governance and the law.116
The problem of coherence connects to the next argument, that ADL is most effective for
otherwise privileged rights claimants (in other words, those who if not for one specific trait would
likely not face discrimination). A decision not to hire a non-passing uneducated former sex-worker
transwoman of color for a low wage job would probably be more difficult to frame as nothing more
than a transphobic decision than a decision to dismiss a white transman software engineer who has
undergone an extensive surgical transition.117 It would undoubtedly be easier to make a claim for
the software engineer without referring to the broader social system of exclusion than to articulate
within ADL the strategies a poor gender variant woman of color had to take in order to survive.118
This is because that system of legal categories included in ADL is focused on the individual who
was harmed and who must belong to a protected category, and the perpetrator who must identify
that category. Accordingly, the tribunal’s task is to decide whether such relational identification
113
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Also known as sex reassignment surgery, gender reassignment surgery, sex affirmation surgery, gender
confirmation surgery, sex realignment surgery, a sex change, and other terms. It refers to medical technologies sought by
trans people with respect to their gender identity and performance such as hormonal replacement therapy, genital
reconstruction surgery, chest/breast surgeries, and so on. Many of these surgeries are also performed on non-trans individuals
for different reasons, but they are only called GSRP when preformed on trans persons. Classifying these surgeries in this
way is another manifestation of the ideological undertone of trans medical discourse.
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This is the case for many other rights claims where lawyers are looking for “good cases,” which are
actually cases that can be told in court without discussing the complex web of social policing that creates the different
challenges people encounter when trying to access resources and opportunities.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

68

[Vol. 20.1

occurred. Intrinsically, this is easier to conclude when all other factors that are not sex/gender, such
as race, class, and ability, do not come into play. ADL mainly serves those who would be otherwise
considered “good” citizens,119 reflecting the characteristics the nation-state imagines its selfdisciplined citizen to portray.120
ADL problems seem to be particularly acute with respect to gender variant rights claimants
because of their multi-layered identities and practices121 leading them to face multiple intertwined
grounds for exclusion.122 As noted, if your identity and experience relate to more than one protected
class, they are less coherent and less likely to be read by a tribunal. When an individual is
understood as signifying more than one kind of subordination, being excluded on both racialized
and gendered grounds, category-based claims are less adequate. The gender variant perspective
implies a need to re-conceptualize ADL in ways that go beyond protected classes. In the following
section, in order to reflect the gender variant perspective, I will offer the hypothesis that gender
variance is a form of “intrasectionality,” following Kimberlé Crenshaw’s work on
intersectionality.123
B. Intersectionality/Intrasectionality

The intersectional analysis put forward by Crenshaw is by now a cornerstone of the
feminist, queer, and critical race critique. Crenshaw has illuminated the law’s inability to reflect
multilayered identities and experiences due to the exclusive nature of the protected classes.124 In
“Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” Crenshaw coined the term
“intersectionality,” describing the reality faced by people whose identities and experiences reflect
more than one category.125 She points out that analyzing harm as only racist, gendered, or economic
creates an inadequate understating of causes and solutions.126 Crenshaw looks at discrimination on
the job market from the perspective of a non-trans black woman.127 When that woman is
discriminated against, the harm occurs at the intersection of her perceived identities, as both a
woman and a black person.128 The intersection analogy allows Crenshaw to point out the false
neutrality of ADL protected classes and to demonstrate how they reflect only privileged members
of such categories. While the protected classes are presented as objective, they actually reflect the
experiences of those that are only one degree of separation from total inclusion because they only
possess one characteristic that could be the cause for exclusion. Crenshaw refers to members of
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Freeman, supra note 113, at 1050–1056.
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TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 245.
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As I will further elaborate in due course, analyzing instances of discrimination demands adopting the
perpetrator point of view. The perpetrator has no “objective” knowledge of the victim’s racial or gendered “biology.”
Moreover, this information is also irrelevant because the reasoning of the harm is driven from the social meaning of a specific
performance, i.e. what it means to be black has nothing to do with genetics, but with public racial perception.
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such protected classes as “those who are privileged but for their racial or sexual characteristics.”129
The discrimination suffered by black women is broader than the legal categories discourse can
express, which is why their needs are seldom addressed.130
ADL does not only see the categories as constructed from mutually exclusive coherent
classes; as I previously argued, ADL also understands the categories to be mutually exclusive in
nature. When one is discriminated against for being black, one cannot also be discriminated against
for being a woman, because the law requires a fixed coherent identity that can relate to a protected
class. If an individual is both black and a woman, it becomes unclear what stands at the root of the
discrimination.131 Furthermore, the proclamation of abstract equality132 premised by the ADL
scheme of mutual exclusivity forces the claimants to pick a side.133 Crenshaw’s analysis urges us
to broaden our critique of ADL and consider how the function of the categories in relation to one
another further hinders the actual realities of marginalized communities within a hierarchal society.
The intersectional analysis is a critique of ADL single axis analysis and a call for a more complex
reading of identities and practices subject to discrimination. The intersectional analysis empowers
us to better account for experiences of multilayered identities and practices, and enables us to bring
to the fore elements of exclusion that ADL struggles to express.134
Nonetheless, intersectionality has been criticized for its heavy reliance on assumed
inherent distinctions between the categories themselves,135 specifically sex and gender.136 From a
deconstructionist point of view, the reliance on categories is flawed because categories cannot
produce anything, but instead simplify “social ﬁctions that produce inequalities in the process of
producing differences.”137 This position would claim that categories are the product of discourse
that creates categorical truth, and not the other way around.138 A more pragmatic strain of critique
argues that Crenshaw’s intersectionality focuses on the complexity of relations among different
groups and not the complexities within a single group, single category, or both.139 This critique goes
on to claim that the “inter” focus of intersectionality does not allow representation of diversity and
heterogeneity of experience to be represented fully.140 Specifically looking at sex, gender, and
sexuality, Valentine suggests the intriguing idea that “age, race, class, and so on don’t merely inflect
or intersect with those experiences we call gender and sexuality but rather shift the very boundaries
of what ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’ can mean in particular contexts.”141
Following Valentine, I will suggest that a gender variant perspective on law demands an
“intrasectional” analysis of the relevant protected classes. That is, I will apply the intersectional
analysis to the protected classes themselves. I suggest that in ADL gender variance is a form of
129
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“intrasectionality,” because theoretically and practically it is almost impossible to distinguish
whether discrimination is a result of one’s perceived sex, sexual orientation, gender expression, or
perhaps a combination. Moreover, I argue that what constitutes the modes by which one is
prescribed to belong to a specific sex, gender, or sexual orientation cannot be read separately from
one’s race, class, ability, or any other social force that shapes one’s life chances.142
I will also argue that having to “pick sides” – whether inside the category between
“woman” and “man,” or outside between “gay” and “trans” – presumes a correlation of
identification that is not neutral but reflects social borders of right and wrong practices and modes
of being. In order to understand the intrasectionality of gender, I will use the facts from Jessi’s and
Tristan’s cases. Following this analysis, I argue that the gender variant experiences of
marginalization stem from existing outside of the structure of coherent identities. By occupying
“in-between” spaces, they challenge the organizing principle of social and legal order based on
mutually exclusive categories.143 Thus, in order to accommodate their interests, we need to look for
the “in-between” spaces of the relevant protected classes and their connection to one another. In
order to do so, I will look at the protected classes that might be used in reference to gender variant
people’s “sex”, “sexual orientation,” “gender identity,” and “gender expression” to find that they
are each heavily shaped by gender performance. I will then discuss the effects of presentation on
ADL to suggest that by understanding it, we might be able to articulate an ADL claim that opens
space for discussion of systematic exclusion.
C. The Case of the “Real” Woman

In March 2015, through the Southern Poverty Law Center, Jessi filed a complaint with the
EEOC.144 Jessi claimed that she was discriminated against because of her gender identity and that
this constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. Jessi also put forward demands regarding sexual
orientation.145 Remembering that her supervisor was troubled by the alleged discrepancies between
how she looked and who she “really was,” we should ask which factors (be they thoughts, beliefs,
feelings or actual events) constituted what Jessi later termed as discrimination. How do they connect
to her gender identity, to her sex, and to her sexual orientation? To answer these questions, I will
first look at how ADL works in regard to a “simple,” classic case of discrimination on the basis of
sex. Next, I will examine the extent to which Jessi’s and Tristan’s claims differ from this classic
case. I conclude that the claims do not substantially differ, but concede that opinions may differ.
Let us consider a case in which a non-trans heterosexual woman is fired for being a woman,
and the court rules this to be unlawful discrimination. The court’s recognition of discrimination
against the woman is premised on the recognition that gender-based dismissal is a violation of the
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex. In other words, because of the prohibition on
sex-based discrimination, a claimant’s gender is an irrelevant characteristic that was unlawfully
utilized by the employer in the decision to fire the claimant. But what actually happened in this
142
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I am not implying that trans people are more “in-between” gender than anybody else or that their identities
are more or less stable than non-trans people. I am certainly not suggesting that trans people are less of men or women than
non-trans people. What I am stating is that in the close system of protected classes that reflect a narrow understanding of
sexed and gendered identities and practices, trans people fall “in-between” because they do not follow the “holy trinity” of
related birth-assigned sex, gender, and sexuality.
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scenario? How did the perpetrator, from their point of view, identify the claimant as a woman? I
will argue that, from the perpetrator’s point of view, all that can be recognized is the claimant’s
performance of gender. Based on gender signifiers, the perpetrator deduces that the subject is a
woman and that her gender performance reflects a “biological” sex. Hence, the woman was not
discriminated against because of “sex,” but because of her gender performance.
The subject perpetually generates her identity by marking herself as a woman in speech,
dress, style of hair, and other signifiers, including administrative ones.146 These external markings
are the only signifiers available to the perpetrator. In practice, the perpetrator only observes the
performance of femininity, which is in effect, to paraphrase Judith Butler, a performance of a
performance, since the perpetrator cannot detect the biology or ontology of the subject’s sex
separately from the markings offered by the performance itself. Under these conditions, sex is
denied an existence independent from the signifiers of gender performance. The perpetrator
(hopefully) does not ‘look inside the woman’s pants’ to decide that she is a woman, but sees her
performance and makes an assumption about her gender. The woman who is the subject of
discrimination does not inhabit her femininity as a role, but continuously constitutes “femininity”
by repeatedly imitating it as a gender identity. The court, however, is limited in its ability to bring
this dynamic to bear on its legal considerations. The inability of the juridical system to recognize
discrimination on grounds of sex as amounting to discrimination on grounds of gender performance
is evidence of its disregard for gender performances as the epistemological basis for the category
of sex itself. In other words, an intrasectional look inside the sex category finds gender performance
at its core, inhabiting the space between the legally recognizable man and the legally recognizable
woman.
Using the lens of drag, Butler’s own paragon of gender performativity, to return to Jessi’s
case enables us to go on and make the claim that sex discrimination is about gender performance.147
Exposing the fallacy of the social deduction of an ontological body onto which we project the
performative meanings of gender, Butler looks at the drag queen’s show as a scene where the
imitation of gender is openly revealed.148 When one looks at the drag queen’s show, one looks at a
biological male performing as a woman. The difference between the drag show and everyday
gender performances (for example, seeing a woman walking down the street) lies in this extra
knowledge one has: that the drag queen’s birth-assigned sex and gender performance do not
correspond.149 Yet, in everyday life we do not know whether the woman in the street was assigned
female at birth, but deduce this from external signifiers of femininity. Butler argues the drag queen
does not imitate femininity, but she imitates an imitation of femininity performed by women in
everyday life. Drag is not a gender performance of biological sex; rather, it is a performance of the
socially accepted feminine performance.150 However, there is no other authentic performance,
146
147
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whether in drag or in everyday life. When we walk down the street, we do not stop and check the
chromosomes of people we see; we note their gender signifiers, their speech, dress, style of hair,
and other characteristics, and deduce that they are women or men who were assigned female or
male at birth. However, these signifiers are all we can note. We have no proof of the existence of
such a thing as “biological sex” outside of gender performance. Hence, there is no independent
meaning to “sex” outside of gender performance.151 We are always looking at an imitation of an
imitation, and this constant imitation is what constitutes “sex” as ontological.152
III. PERFORMATIVE DISCRIMINATION – THE DRAG SHOW AS LITIGATION STRATEGY

Jessi’s case reveals to the court the “truth” that drag shows expose, by forcing the court to
analyze a case where the imitation is apparent. This case came to court after the claimant had already
been “outed” as lacking a correlation between her sex, gender, and gender identity. Due to the
framework of ADL, when the court faces charges of discrimination, it must first shift its perspective
outside to locate the subjective point of view of the perpetrator. From there, the court must judge
whether or not a distinction was made and, if so, whether this distinction was made on the basis of
a relevant difference. When Jessi brought her case before the EEOC, she claimed to be a victim of
discrimination on the basis of sex. The tribunal ostensibly needs to decide whether Jessi is a woman
who has been treated differently than a man, but in actuality it is her womanhood that is contested
by the perpetrator. Her “in-betweenness” is what stands before the tribunal.153
In order to rule on her claim, the tribunal needed to differentiate between dismissal because
one is a transwoman and dismissal because one is a non-transwoman. The difference is that in the
case of the transwoman, the perpetrator knows that her gender performance is an imitation without
a “biological truth” behind it.154 The transwoman is discriminated against exactly when the
perpetrator encounters her “fakeness,” i.e. that there is no correlation between her birth-assigned
sex and gender presentation. In Jessi’s case, it is possible to “pinpoint” the negative animus that
grew out of Jessi’s presentation because Jessi’s supervisor undoubtedly knew that she was a
transwoman (she told him so), but felt her femininity was “fake.”155 Thus, the discriminated against
151
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transwoman, like the drag queen, reveals the falseness of the sex category because she fits the same
prerequisite – her birth-assigned sex not correlating to her gender presentation. The transwoman’s
failure of coherence in performance is at the basis of her discrimination, proving that there is no
“authentic” core to the legally protected class besides the repetitive imitation of gender signifiers.
Yet, this is not only true to the transwoman. She is not more “fake,” nor does she engage in
imitation, any more than the non-transwoman. Thus, her claim exposes the significant role that
gender performance plays in the ADL-protected category of “sex.” Jessi’s claim exists in between
the legally protected classes and facilitates an intrasectional look inside the protected class itself,
not only exposing the false premise of the dichotomy, but also revealing the space between the
mutually exclusive categories underpinning gender performativity.
In summary, from the perpetrator’s point of view, one can only comprehend gender
performance, and it is in fact the performance that motivates the perpetrator’s decision-making
process.156 However, this performance is not evident to any pre-legal, pre-social inner truth about
one’s “sex.” Rather, it is the performance that constitutes the ontological status of the protected
class of sex. When the law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, it prohibits discrimination
on the basis of performance. In practice, a non-trans heterosexual feminine woman can be
discriminated against because her womanhood is understood as signifying and reaffirming the
hierarchy that produces her subordination. Likewise, gender variant people might be discriminated
against because they fail to signify their participation in this social system, intentionally or not.
Therefore, I argue that discrimination on the basis of sex, specifically when directed at
gender variants as well as non-trans individuals, is discrimination on the basis of gender
performance. The basis for comparison in sex discrimination should shift. In addition to considering
whether a woman is treated differently than a man, we should also consider whether an individual
was treated differently than someone whose gender performance is coherent. Let us keep in mind
that coherent gender performance connects to proper citizenship; hence coherent gender
performance is not only about being perceived as masculine, heterosexual, and male, but also white,
middle class, and able-bodied. It should also be noted that the non-trans heterosexual feminine
woman might be considered as not having coherent gender when her acts or omissions deviate from
her social role as subordinated to men (for example, when she tries to cross the occupational
segregation walls).157
Yet, I will argue that performance is not only at the core of discrimination on the basis of
sex. Trans and gender variant individuals use a variety of protected classes beyond sex to make
their claims. Jessi herself argued that her discrimination was also based on sexual orientation.
Moreover, as a result of two decades of trans liberal advocacy in different jurisdictions across the
United States and the world, we now have protected classes designed for trans people specifically,
such as gender expression and identity.158 I argue that all these different protected classes can also
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be understood through the lens of performance. I also argue that using performance could have an
impact on the coercive power of protected classes over heterogeneous experiences of identity and
practices.
A. Other Dissenters of the Holy Trinity

Looking at the list of protected classes in local state legalizations159 or the ENDA,160 one
can easily see how they reflect categories of identity. “Sexual orientation” is designated for gays
and lesbians, and “gender identity” for transgender people. These categories represent deviations
from the “holy trinity” of normative sex, gender, and sexuality. An intrasectional look inside these
protected classes would reveal that in the spaces between the mutually exclusive categories, gender
performance is abundant. This is why it is almost impossible to know whether one’s motives for
discrimination are homophobic, transphobic, or sexist. Any deviation from the “holy trinity” makes
one less of a subject, and this process is the privatized embodiment of the social mechanism of
exclusion that fuels discrimination. Moreover, these deviations are often not straightforward, but
rather combine different aspects of sex and gender practices and identities shaped by other
dimensions of subordination such as race, class, and ability. This leads me to question the very need
for these different protected classes, and to ask how we can make better use of community resources
to advance marginalized individuals.
Closed identity categories are a threat to heterogeneous experiences of identity and
practices, as they exercise coercive power over the imagined community they represent.
Functioning as a “straightening device,”161 identity categories conceal intragroup power relations
and social stratification.162 Their universalizing trait renders invisible the needs and struggles of
those at the margins of the intragroup mainstream, which are usually parallel to general social
mainstream.163 That is, the interests of those in the group who are in line with social hegemony (in
everything but the characteristic that makes them part of the group) take up a disproportionate part
of the agenda.164 These concerns grow when we consider that other members of the group face far
more complicated mechanisms of exclusion because of their intersectionality. Furthermore, the
ones who are the hegemonic members of the protected classes of sexual orientation and gender
identity and expression are precisely those who can follow, or can articulate their demands in
accordance with, the normative model of genders. Their claims for inclusion do not question the
social system of stratification that facilitates the exclusion – typically, they ask for inclusion within
that system based on their sameness. Yet they are the ones best fit to bring forward a sameness
159
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claim because their identities and practices coincide with hegemonic experiences.
However, even though they are highly problematic, I am not arguing that one should not
use the sex, gender, and sexuality protected classes. Rather, I argue that one should understand them
as reflecting performance and should bring forward demands that recognize this function of ADL.
An intrasectional look inside these sub categories would reveal that performance plays a major role
in how they are translated into ADL. In the following section, I will argue that all these different
protected classes can be understood as demanding the court to compare the treatment the victim
received to the treatment of someone whose performance is coherent with the socially accepted
norms of good sexual and gendered citizenship.
B. Gender Identity and Gender Expression: Thank You for Admitting We Exist

There is no need to discuss at length how “gender identity,” and even more so “gender
expression,” relates directly to gender performance. The above analysis of “sex” as a protected class
applies to these protected classes as well. From the perpetrator’s point of view, one’s gender identity
can only be read through one’s gender performance. Therefore, the proposed shift in the basis of
comparison is relevant to these protected classes, because when determining whether the perpetrator
discriminated against an individual for their gender identity or expression, we consider whether an
individual was treated differently than someone whose performance is coherent.
Moreover, considering that everybody has a gender identity and everybody expresses their
gender, it seems that these categories should not apply just to trans people. Their existence indicates
that the law previously refused to recognize gender variance discrimination, claiming that it could
not be articulated within existing protected classes. That is, the existence of gender identity as
distinct protected classes reflects an assumption that “sex” only refers to “real” men and women;
otherwise, trans people would already be included. This category teaches us that in the current legal
regime sex discrimination only applies to the allegedly ontological differences between feminine
women who were assigned female at birth and masculine men who were assigned male at birth.
Lacking the ability to read gender variance into the protected class of “sex” testifies to the
ideological framework concealed in the legal “sex” category and to the law’s role in upholding the
borders of gender. From this perspective, the enactment of the protected classes of “gender identity”
and “gender expression” does not address the hierarchal social system of gender, but rather
collaborates with it, upholding an ontological difference between gender variant people and
everybody else.
However, gender expression and identity as protected classes can be used to promote a
more structural discussion when they are understood in relation to gender performativity.
Claimants, trans or non-trans, can use these categories to claim they were discriminated against
based on their gender performance. That is, claimants can argue that they were treated differently
than a person whose gender is coherent with the social norms. In this way, claimants would need
less to “prove” that they belong into a certain category. Instead, the claimant would focus on
exposing the privileges granted to those whose gender performance coheres to the social norms,
promoting a legal debate on how those social norms structure hierarchies of normativity and how
this normativity is reflected in the labor force.
C. Sexual Orientation: Are You a Boy, a Girl, or a Faggot?

Jessi did not claim she was discriminated against based on her sexual orientation by
mistake; she claimed it because the lines between sexual and gender deviation and between sex and
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gender are blurry. Practices that constitute both deviations are connected to performativity in a
broader sense – one that accounts for how normative heterosexual identities are constituted as
coherent. These categories are intertwined in reality.165 I argue that sexual orientation is a form of
gender variance and vice versa precisely because gender variance is inextricably connected to
sexuality. Intrasectional analysis of sexual orientation as a protected category can suggest an inner
connection between the protected classes that make up the “holy trinity” and the “in-between”
spaces of presentation they share. This allows us to conceptualize the uses of a discrimination claim
on the basis of presentation, and to imagine who we might find in the “in-betweens.”
Prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is supposed to protect gay,
lesbians and bisexuals from discrimination on the basis of their different sexuality – in other words,
they should not be discriminated against based on who they choose for sexual partners. Much like
the perpetrator in the case of the transwoman, the perpetrator here never sees the victim have sex
in order to identify that the victim is non-heterosexual. The perpetrator sees “something” that is a
proxy for the victim’s sexuality, but what is that something? Much like in the previous discussion,
a significant part of the knowledge the perpetrator has over the victim is deduced from the victim’s
performance.
Here, as in regards to trans people, performativity is a broad term. It can consist of feminine
or masculine behaviors that indicate non-heterosexuality. Yet, this is not all that constitutes
performativity. When Butler talks about gender performativity, she is not yet considering trans
identities and practices but actually talking about gay identities.166 Butler’s claim is that
heterosexuality is compulsory in that it forces the subject to participate in an endless cycle of
repetition of the heterosexual norms as a precondition for coherence that constitutes the subject,
and that gay identities are also formed in relation to that imitation mechanism that creates gender
presentation.167 Although Butler talks directly about “bodily gestures, movements, and styles of
various kinds,” from her own description of the repetitive gender act it is clear that all actions that
signify one as having a coherent identity constitute presentation. For example, these actions include
a man acting out his heterosexuality by making sexist jokes at lunchtime. Alternatively, a gay
person “coming out” to colleagues or having their gayness revealed by rumors or social media can
be considered acts that constitute their gender as incoherent.
Returning to ADL, when the perpetrator makes unlawful decisions based on someone’s
sexual orientation, it is likely that they discriminate against them based on their performance. The
perpetrator can “use” the information transmitted through the gender signifiers to deduce that the
victim is gay, and based on this assumption, the perpetrator discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation. Moreover, lesbian, gay, and bisexual subjects are discriminated against because their
sexuality deviates from the socially accepted norms of sex, gender, and sexuality, meaning that they
do not conform to one (or more) pieces of the heteronormative puzzle of masculine/male/men
sexually attracted to feminine/female/women. For example, calling someone a “faggot” or asking
someone if they are “a boy or a girl” both aim to signify that one has trespassed the borders of sex,
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gender, and sexuality.
The LGB individual’s insubordination is revealed by their “failed”168 imitation – for
example, when the lesbian wears “masculine” attire or when the gay man brings his partner instead
of a wife to the office party. Hence, when LGB subjects are discriminated against for their sexual
orientation, their exclusion can be understood as related to their gender performativity in its broader
sense. That is not to say that discrimination could not be based on actual aversion to the idea of gay
sex, but that the fantasy of gay sex and the reality of performativity might not always be so easily
separable. Therefore, when considering discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, like sex,
we do not simply try to decide whether a gay man was treated differently than a straight man, but
also whether an individual was treated differently than someone whose gender presentation is
coherent.
IV. CONCLUSION: SHIFTING THE BASIS OF COMPARISON

I have argued that anti-discrimination law’s protection of sex, sexual orientation, gender
identity, and expression can all be better understood through the idea of performativity. I argued
that the residue of gender performativity is present in the in-between spaces of the mutually
exclusive categories that comprise the protected classes. Now I will address the possibilities this
analysis opens up. These possibilities cannot answer all the concerns around the use of ADL that
the transgender movement is debating, but they might open up a small “in-between” space that can
harness the ever-growing use of ADL by trans people (as well as other LGB people and
organizations) to serve the interests of marginalized individuals.
The division into the sub categories of gender, sex, and sexuality itself enforces the claim
that the characteristics represented in the protected class are exclusive and that they are not
inextricably connected, creating and promoting the illusion that sex, gender, and sexuality have
nothing to do with each other. The normative model this axiom sets forth allows access to legal
protection only to those who can articulate their identities and experiences within these normalizing
models. Protection based on gender identity is easily available to a person who has received
recognition of their gender non-conformity by a medical institution – for example, a person who is
diagnosed with gender dysphoria, a recognition that is granted by expressing a “fierce and
demanding”169 drive for gender normativity.170 A white educated transman working as a software
engineer at IBM, who is immersed in “proper” discourses of transitioning as a way of reintegrating
into society with his “true” self and supported by his longtime female-identified partner, will most
likely find a sympathetic ear in court in a case of unlawful dismissal. That is because his identity
can be perceived as coherent, in line with the law’s conception of sex and gender, and appearing as
a neutral characteristic and not as signifiers of the mechanism of social stratification.
On the other hand, the chances are lower for getting legal protection against an unlawful
dismissal of a non-passing, black, gender variant woman who identifies occasionally as trans and
occasionally as gay, has no education or capital, and who engages in sex work. In fact, her chances
of accessing the law to begin with are almost non-existent, not to mention securing legal
representation or having the time and money to pursue legal action. Yet, even if her case would end
up in a courtroom, it would be challenged by her apparent lack of coherence. For example, her
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employer might find a sympathetic ear for an argument that she might “confuse the customers,” as
was claimed about Tristan, making the decision to terminate one’s employment appear reasonable.
Moreover, this woman would have to frame her claim as either arising from her “sex,” “gender
identity,” “gender expression” or “sexual orientation,” when in fact all these categories collapse
into each other in her lived experience and are shaped by her affective history of race and class
more than they are informed by academic or medical discourse.
In both cases, when we take a deeper look, questioning the artificial boundaries between
sex, gender, and sexuality and considering them as complementary components of the socially
accepted norms, one cannot be sure what went on inside the perpetrator’s mind, or what sort of
information propelled their decision. How can we know what kind of trespassing of the borders of
gender, sex, and sexuality is visible to the perpetrator, which they then unlawfully considered in
their decision? Do they consider the transwoman to be a non-masculine man? A homosexual? A
non-feminine woman? A transsexual? Is she discriminated against because of her sex? Her gender?
Her gender presentation? Her sexual orientation? How does her class, ability, and race positionality
impact how the perpetrator perceives her performance? There is actually no way to answer these
questions, precisely because coherent gender performance must always reflect a heterosexual
correlation between sex, gender, and gender presentation of a hegemonic member of society,171 thus
deviation from coherence can reflect any deviation from any of these categories.
As I have suggested earlier in the context of gender identity, shifting the basis of
comparison by understanding the role performativity plays in discrimination could facilitate an
expansion of the legal discussion. Instead of comparing man/woman, straight/gay, and trans/nontrans, the tribunal would compare the victim with someone whose gender performance is coherent.
Remember, the non-trans heterosexual feminine woman might also be considered as not having
coherent gender when her acts or omissions deviate from her social role as subordinated to men.
Likewise, gender variant people, trans, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals might be considered as not
having coherent gender when they fail to signify their participation in this social system of
normative sex, gender, and sexuality. Hence, by allowing the shift in articulating legal claims,
referring to the presentational dimensions of the discrimination, the tribunal would not be troubled
by the coherence of the victim, but would have to evaluate the privileges that come from having
coherent gender presentation.
There is evidence that the federal arbitrator that ruled that Tristan was discriminated
against “because of his sex” in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 recognized that
Tristan experienced this discrimination because of his performance.172 The arbitrator found that
Tristan “involuntarily resigned in order to escape an intolerable and illegal employment
requirement imposed by the corporate office – that he act and dress only as a female[.]”173 The
arbitrator also found that “after learning that Broussard’s driver’s license stated female, [the
employer] began to act in a manner showing that it perceived Broussard did not comply with the
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traditional gender stereotypes of a female.”174 Similarly, in Jessi’s case, the EEOC stated that “sex
discrimination under Title VII includes not just discrimination because of biological sex, but also
gender stereotypes, i.e., when an employer treats an employee differently for failing to conform to
gender-based expectations or norms. Discrimination against transgender individuals because of
his/her gender non-conforming is sex discrimination.”175 The federal arbitrator’s direct reference to
how one ‘acts and dresses,’ as well as to ‘gender stereotypes,’ and the EEOC’s findings about
gender norms and expectations support the claim that the basis of comparison must shift. Both
reasonings are in line with the idea that performance motivates the discrimination. While the federal
arbitrator and the EEOC only take this stand with respect to gender variance claims, my analysis
suggests that this reformulation of ADL has far-reaching implications that go beyond the imaginary
borders of the category of “transgender.”
The current inability of the law and juridical system to recognize discrimination on
grounds of sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression as amounting to
discrimination on grounds of gender performance is evidence of the disregard of gender
performance as the epistemological basis of the categories themselves. In the current legal situation,
courts are searching to uncover whether or not the victim was read by the perpetrator as belonging
to a protected class by virtue of the victim’s coherent identity. Instead I suggest that it is the lack of
coherence that should be the starting point, leaving the tribunal free to search for and discover the
social norms the perpetrator had in mind.
This formulation too has its limitations because it is still set inside an individualist
framework, which does not allow direct discourse about systematic disparities. However, it does
allow us to use the available tools of ADL to have a legal discussion that does not revolve solely
around the identity and practices of the victim but focuses on the social ideologies of hierarchical
distribution of resources and opportunities that created their exclusion in the first place. This
rephrasing of the legal analytical tools of ADL seems to be particularly acute with respect to gender
variant rights claimants because they have multi-layered identities and practices176 and thus face
multiple intertwined grounds for exclusion.177
By placing the socially predominant standards of good citizenship at the center of the legal
debate, the law might move away from its fixation on coherence as the only available framework
for making claims. This would not only allow more claims to be made, but it would facilitate a
broader systematic discussion within the framework of ADL. I am not suggesting that shifting the
basis of comparison would alleviate the economic and other obstructions that negatively impact the
ability of marginalized individuals to make legal claims. Instead, I suggest that rephrasing legal
demands is a way to promote a legal discussion about the systemic aspects of exclusion, in hopes
of better utilizing individual claims to offer protection and promote the interests of a more diverse
range of identities, practices, and experiences. In conclusion, rather than heavily investing in putting
the word “transgender” into the law, transgender advocates can potentially lead a legal movement
that could reshape how we use readily available anti-discrimination law, focusing on what people
need and want instead of who they are or are not.
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